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Abstract 
This study seeks to explore how Turkey is represented in the most widely circulated Saudi Arabian and 
Turkish daily newspapers that cover Noor, one of the most popular Arabic dubbed Turkish television 
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to fit specific agendas resulting in markedly different images of Turkey. Ultimately, it is underlined that 
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self-image against a largely negative representation of the Turkish cultural Other in the Saudi 
newspapers that cover Noor. 
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ANLATILARIN ÇERÇEVELENMESİ YOLUYLA TÜRKİYE 
TEMSİLİ-SUUDİ ARABİSTAN VE TÜRK GAZETELERİNDE 
NOOR (GÜMÜŞ) DİZİSİ 
 
Öz 
Bu çalışmanın amacı, yüksek tirajlı Suudi Arabistan ve Türk gazetelerinin Suudi Arabistan’da en çok 
izlenen Arapça dublajlı Türk dizilerinden biri olan Noor (Gümüş) dizisine dayanarak yaptığı haberler 
sonucu ortaya çıkan Türkiye imgelerini incelemektir. Çalışmada, söz konusu diziye ilişkin olarak Suudi 
Arabistan ve Türk gazeteleri tarafından kullanılan haber çerçevelerinin farklı Türkiye imgeleri 
oluşturduğunun altı çizilmektedir. Çalışmada, Türk gazetelerinin Arapça dublajlı dizi için kullandığı 
haber çerçevelerinin olumlu bir Türkiye imgesi oluştururken, Suudi Arabistan gazetelerinin kullandığı 
haber çerçevelerinin Türk kültürünün ötekileştirilmesine yol açtığı sonucuna varılmıştır. 
 
Anahtar Terimler 
Arapça dublajlı Türk dizileri, Noor (Gümüş), imge, anlatı, çerçeve. 
 
 
Introduction 
The aim of the study 
Turkish television series have been enjoying popular success in the Arab world since 
the Middle East Broadcasting Company (hereafter MBC), a Saudi-owned pan-Arab 
satellite channel, aired Noor in 2008.1 This study seeks to explore the discursive 
construction of Turkey’s image in Saudi Arabian and Turkish news reports that cover 
Noor, which is seen as “the most significant case” of Arabized Turkish series that 
generated a “media revolution” in the Arab world (Buccianti, 2010, p. 4). The case study 
is based on the most widely circulated Saudi and Turkish newspapers that feature high 
readership and are influential in setting the tone for coverage in their respective 
countries. 
                                                     
1 The title of the Turkish series that is named after the main female character Gümüş (i.e. “silver” in English) is 
changed into Noor (i.e. “light” in English) in the Arabic translation. 
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The research questions which will guide the case study are as follows: 
 What image of Turkey is being promoted by the Saudi and Turkish newspapers’ 
coverage of Noor?  
 How are the narratives on Noor framed for the Saudi audience’s reception? And 
how do such narratives fit in the larger narratives on Turkey circulating in the 
Arab world?  
 How do the Turkish newspapers frame the narratives on Noor? And how do 
those narratives dovetail with Turkey’s self-image? 
In order to answer the research questions, the study will draw on imagology, or image 
studies, as elaborated by Manfred Beller and Joep Leerssen (2007). The study will 
examine how Turkey’s image is constructed by the Turkish newspapers in order to 
explore Turkey’s own image, or to use Leersen’s (2007) term, “self-image”/“auto-
image” created within the context of Noor. As for the exploration of Turkey’s “hetero-
image” (Leersen, 2007), the choice of Saudi Arabian newspapers over those published in 
the other Arab countries is motivated by the need to limit the scope of the analysis. The 
study focuses on the Saudi newspapers, since Saudi Arabia had, at the time when Noor 
was aired, a high number of viewers watching the series (Buccianti, 2010, p. 3). 
Furthermore, MBC, which dub and air the series, is owned by the Saudi businessman 
Sheikh Waleed Al Ibrahim. 
The study will also draw on the concepts of narrative and framing as understood 
in social sciences. Since the media use certain frames in order to “promote certain 
connections in the minds of the readers” (Valdeon, 2016, p. 15), frames which are 
“strategic moves that are consciously initiated in order to present a movement or a 
particular position within a certain perspective” (Baker, 2006, p. 106), contribute to the 
construction of “the literally ‘common sense’ (i.e., widespread) interpretation of events” 
(Entman, 1991, p. 7). Therefore, the frames which are used to construct Turkey’s image 
in the Turkish and Saudi news have a potential to socialize their respective readers into 
specific representations of Turkey that guide both their reception of Arabic dubbed 
Turkish series and their perception of Turkey.  
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Key Concepts 
Images and stereotypes 
Image is “the mental silhoutte of the other, who appears to be determined by the 
characteristics of family, group, tribe, people or race” (Beller, 2007, p. 4). Stereotypes, on 
the other hand, “are concerned with explaining cultural and social patterns from a 
purported character” (Leerssen, 2000, p. 282). Stereotyping ascribes certain 
characteristics to a particular nationality as “typical” of the nation under discussion 
(Leerssen, 2000, p. 284). In this context,  
[o]n the one hand, ‘‘typical’’ (as in ‘‘I saw a typically Spanish bullfight’’) 
means that a certain type (Spanish) is marked and characterized and that 
the attribute or characteristic in question (bullfight) is representative of the 
type at large. On the other hand, typical means that the attribute in 
question is salient, nontrivial, remarkable, and noteworthy and that a 
bullfight is something that strikes the unwary observer as something out 
of the ordinary (Leerssen, 2000, p. 284). 
Against the backdrop of these points, imagology seeks “to describe the origin, process 
and function of national prejudices and stereotypes, to bring them to the surface, 
analyse them and make people rationally aware of them” rather than explaining the 
characteristics of nations and/or nationalities (Beller, 2007, p. 11-12). Imagology also 
aims to foreground the difference between auto-images (i.e. “characterological 
reputation current within and shared by a group”) and hetero-images (i.e. “the opinion 
that others have about a group’s purported character”) (Leersen, 2007, p. 342-343). In 
this context, it is useful for researchers who draw on imagology to explore the 
“dynamics” between the auto- and hetero-images (Beller and Leerssen, 2007, p. xiv) of a 
nation, since cultural differences may influence the way national images are 
constructed. 
The image of one culture whose cultural product (for instance, among others, 
literary texts, films, television series) is translated into the language of another culture 
can be constructed (i) through the pre-translation stage at which a cultural product is 
selected for translation, which Luc van Doorslaer (2010, p. 63) refers to as “the image-
setting stage of text selection”, (ii) during the translation stage at which the translation 
is modified in line with the image existing in the mind(s) of the translator and/or other 
translatorial agents, and (iii) during the reception stage which plays a significant role in 
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shaping the reception of the translated product and its interpretation in the receiving 
culture.  
In line with its objectives, this study will limit itself to the relationship between 
translation and image-building during the reception stage at which certain 
presentational elements (i.e. paratexts) have a significant image-setting effect. Note here 
that paratexts serve to show how translations are “presented” to their recepients (Tahir-
Gürçağlar, 2011, p. 113) and how they are contextualized. Hence, the study seeks to 
analyze how Noor is contextualized by Saudi and Turkish newspapers, which will in 
turn contribute to the exploration of how Turkey’s image is constructed through 
journalistic paratexts.2 
Narrative framing 
Narratives, which are “the everyday stories we live by” (Baker, 2006, p. 3), not only 
represent reality but also constitute it (Bruner, 1991, p. 5). Narratives enable people to 
dig into the larger narratives circulating in society (Baker, 2006, p. 19). Hence, it is 
significant to look beyond a specific image as constructed in a narrative, in order to 
explore its role in the elaboration of a broader set of narratives in society. Being 
“dynamic entities” (Baker, 2006, p. 3), narratives may shift along with new experience 
and new stories. Images are dynamic (Leerssen, 2000, p. 277), too, since they may 
change throughout time with changing socio-political conditions and hence with 
changing narratives.  
Framing, a significant methodological tool of social narrative theory, also plays a 
decisive role in creating social reality. Baker (2006, p. 167) defines frames as “structures 
of anticipation, strategic moves that are consciously initiated in order to present a 
narrative in a certain light”. Hence, national images and stereotypes can be constructed, 
reinforced or contested through framing that is, in Baker’s (2006, p. 156) words, based 
on “[s]ome choices, particularly those relating to how we label an event, place or group, 
as well as the way we position individuals and communities in social and political 
space through the use of pronouns and adverbs of place, among other things […]”. 
Translation studies’ account of framing, as explained by Baker (2006), focuses on 
how textual interventions (e.g. additions, omissions, rewordings, and the like) in 
translations and paratextual commentaries on translations are related to the broader 
                                                     
2 Even though Leerssen (2007, s. 26) notes that journalistic texts are “more ephemeral sources” than works of 
literature for research on national image, van Doorslaer (2010, s. 62) argues that it is significant to take their “impact” 
into account. 
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narratives (for instance, religious, politico-historical, and so on) in which those 
translations are embedded. In this context, the construction of the way the narratives on 
Arabic dubbed Turkish series are presented by Saudi and Turkish newspapers can be 
seen as “paratextual framing”, to use Baker’s (2006, p. 133) term.  
The notion of framing used in translation studies overlaps to some extent with 
the notion of framing used in communication studies in its emphasis on the fact that 
framing constructs how a narrative is to be presented in order to guide audience 
reception. In journalistic production, a frame is used as a structure that “essentially 
involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality 
and make them more salient in a communicating text” (Entman 1993, p. 52). A frame 
manifests itself in journalistic texts through several framing devices, such as metaphors, 
examplars (e.g.  historical stories from which lessons are drawn), catchphrases, 
depictions, and visual images (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989, p. 3-4); and “through 
repetition, placement, and reinforcing associations with each other, the words and 
images that comprise the frame render one basic interpretation more readily 
discernible, comprehensible, and memorable than others” (Entman, 1991, p. 7). This 
point also explains how national images can be naturalized through journalistic 
framing. 
Since “many of the framing devices can appear as ‘natural’, unremarkable 
choices of words […]”, it is necessary to focus on comparison which would reveal how 
the same narrative is framed in different journalistic texts (Entman, 1991, p. 6). The 
search for how a single narrative can be framed differently by different narrators is 
crucial, because, as Baker (2006, p. 22) suggests, “[e]very time a version of the narrative 
is retold […], it is injected with elements from other, broader narratives circulating 
within the new setting or from the personal narratives of the retellers”. In this context, 
the present study suggests that the Saudi and Turkish newspapers would give valuable 
insights into the different representations of Turkey in their coverage of the Arabic 
dubbed Turkish television series. 
 
Turkey’s image in the Arab world 
It is significant to consider national images in their historical contexts. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to explore Arabs’ perception of Turks in the past in order to reveal the 
dynamics that may still be at work in shaping Turkey’s image today. Turks who 
converted to Islam in the seventh century were regarded as barbaric at the initial stage 
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of the Arab–Turkish encounter (Jung 2005, p. 4). This image had, on the one hand, a 
positive connotation in that it emphasized the significant military role assumed by 
Turks to protect Islam against non-Muslims in Anatolia (see McDonald, p. 1998). On the 
other hand, the image of wild but courageous Turks turned, throughout time, into a 
negative image that portrayed Turks as “cruel and despotic power addict[s]” without 
any cultural sophistication (Haarmann, 1988, p. 176). This negative image prevailed as 
“a narrative of Turkish oppression” during the Ottoman reign (Jung, 2005, p. 5), which 
was also seen as “the nightmare of alien, uncivilized Turkish rule” and as “the cause for 
the depressing age of decadence, inhitat” (Haarman, 1988, p. 187). The image of “the 
terrible Turk” was linked to the narrative that Turks were the “violent suppresser[s] of 
Arab nationalism” (Jung, 2005, p. 3-4); hence, Arab nationalism was claimed to have 
emerged as a reaction to the Ottoman tyranny (Zeine, 1966, p. 142).  
The demise of the Ottoman Empire following the World War I ended the four-
hundred-year Ottoman rule over Arabs. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founding father of 
the new Turkish state, severed Turkey’s ties with Arabs. Atatürk’s westernization 
project, which was based on, among other things, secularism, purging Turkish from the 
words of Arabic origin, the latinization of the Turkish script, and the abolition of the 
caliphate, drove Turks apart from Arabs. Furthermore, Turkey’s recognition of Israel in 
1949, its NATO membership in 1952 and partnership with the United States reinforced 
Arabs’ negative perception of Turks (Hale, p. 2000). As a result, “the Arab narrative of 
the ‘terrible Turk’ gradually shifted from the notion of Ottoman-Turkish oppression to 
Turkey as an instrument of imperialistic western interests” (Jung, 2005, p. 11).  
Over the past decade, however, Turkish television series have played an 
extremely important role in creating, to a certain extent, a positive image of Turkey by 
displaying Turks as “a modern pro-Western but also Islamic nation” (Kujawa, 2011, p. 
4-5). According to Jabbour (2005, p. 7), Turkish series promote an image of Turkey as 
“an ideal society where Islam coexists with modernity, where men and women are 
equal, and where capitalism and consumerism do not erode social and religious 
values”. Such an image is also in harmony with the Turkish government’s 
promulgation of Turkey’s self-image as a role model which is “intrinsic to its national 
brand in the [Middle East] region and part of its economic allure” (Kraidy and Al-
Ghazzy, 2013b, p. 2349). 
Turkish series have been adapted to the Arab world both through linguistic 
changes and through the modification of the content. The linguistic transformation of 
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Turkish series involves the alteration of the Turkish names of series and fictional 
characters into Arabic names. One reason for this might be MBC’s desire to smooth out 
the estranging effect of Turkish series, which would in turn make Arab viewers identify 
themselves with the characters. Furthermore, Turkish series are dubbed into colloquial 
Syrian Arabic rather than classical Arabic, which was previously used for the dubbing 
of foreign television series. This has also enabled Arab viewers to identify themselves 
with Turkish characters and to interiorize the message of Turkish series, which gives 
rise to “a sense of proximity” between Turks and Arabs (Jabbour, 2015, p. 13).  
As for the content modification, MBC has been heavily censoring the content of 
series to make them acceptable to a conservative audience. For instance, in the case of 
series which are based on the story of infidelity, virginity, premarital sex and the like 
that would breach social and religious norms of Arab society, MBC removes the scenes 
(Buccianti, p. 2010). One potential reason is that such scenes might offend the 
sensibilities of Arab viewers. It goes without saying that such modifications have 
resulted in the rise of Turkish series in the Arab world by reducing their alienating 
effect, as a result of which “Turkey has begun to exercise a big influence at Arab dinner 
tables, in boardrooms and bedrooms from Morocco to Iraq […]” (Kimmelman 2010).  
The popularity of Turkish series in the Arab world can be evaluated within the 
context of the “neo-Ottoman cool” frame (Kraidy and Al-Ghazzi 2013b, p. 2348). Neo-
Ottomanism is concerned with projecting Turkey’s image as a holder of soft power that 
serves as “a bridge between East and West, a Muslim nation, a secular state, a 
democratic political system, and a capitalistic economic force” (Taşpınar, 2008, p. 3). 
Having realized that television series feed into Turkey’s soft power in the Arab world, 
the Turkish government announced that prizes and financial awards would be given to 
producers and directors who export media products that create a positive Turkish 
image in foreign countries (Kraidy and Al-Ghazzi, 2013b, p. 2348). Furthermore, the 
Turkish government launched TRT Al Arabiyya, a Turkish television channel in Arabic, 
in order to maintain Turkey’s positive image. It goes without saying that TRT Al 
Arabiyya caters for the narrative position of the Turkish government that, as Brock 
(2014, p. 1-2) suggests, has been elaborating the narrative of Turkey’s self- image as a 
regional leader and a democratic model in the Middle East.  
On the other hand, some Arab circles frame the instruments of Turkish popular 
culture and mass entertainment within the context of the “Neo-Ottomans’ invasion of 
the Arab world to restore their grandfathers’ glorious days” (Mohamed, 2012, p. 144). 
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Arabic dubbed Turkish series are criticized, since they are considered to“represent a 
Muslim society that hardly represents Islam” (Delaimi, 2010, p. 4). Hence, it is necessary 
to underline that framing is a dialectical process (Gamson and Modigliani, p. 1989). 
That is, a frame may co-exist with a counterframe, as in the case of the neo-Ottoman 
cool versus neo-Ottoman invasion frames.  
 
An Analysis of the Framing of Narratives on Turkey’s Image 
Methodology 
Two corpora are built for this study: one on the narratives circulated by the Saudi 
newspapers,3 and the other on the narratives elaborated by the Turkish newspapers.4 
Following Alarfaj (2013, p. 14), who groups the most widely circulated Saudi 
newspapers into their geographical location of publication (i.e. Al-Riyadh and Aljazeera 
published in Riyadh, the capital city of Saudi Arabia; Al-Medina and Okaz, published in 
Jeddah, the Western Region of the Kingdom; Al-Youm, published in Dammam in the 
Eastern Region; Al-Watan, based in the the Southern Region; and Al-Sharq al-Awsat and 
Al-Hayat, published in London), the Saudi news corpus involves Al-Riyadh and 
Aljazeera, Al-Medina, Okaz, Al-Youm, and Al-Sharq al-Awsat. The study’s research on Al-
Hayat and Al-Watan has not yielded any data on Noor’s representation of Turkish 
culture. The Turkish newspapers chosen for the Turkish corpus are Yeni Şafak, the 
symbol of the conservative Islamist press media in Turkey;5 Hurriyet and Sabah, which 
are center-right newspapers;6 and Radikal and Cumhuriyet, which have leftist tendencies. 
This study does not intend to carry out a quantitative analysis which identifies 
the concordance of the linguistic features used to construct Turkey’s image in the 
selected newspapers. The aim, on the other hand, is to identify certain frames which 
contribute to the emergence of the broad frame of “[neo-Ottoman] colonialism” (Torelli, 
2014, p. 44) in the Arab newspapers that construct Turkey’s image within their coverage 
of Noor and to the emergence of the broad frame of “neo-Ottoman cool” (Kraidy and Al-
Ghazzi, 2013b, p. 2348), which is used to represent Turkey in the Turkish newspapers. 
                                                     
3 With thanks to Diala Erikat of Hacettepe University for translating the Arabic news reports. 
4 All translations from Turkish into English are mine, unless otherwise indicated. 
5 Zaman, now a defunct newspaper that was another symbol of Islamist press media, is not involved in the study, 
since the relevant news content was not accessible. 
6 Sabah is also known as a pro-government newspaper. 
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In identifying the frames, the study will take into consideration that framing is not a 
matter of words, but a “mode of thought, a mode of action” (Castells, 2009, p. 158). 
Given that the first episode of Noor was aired by MBC in February 27, 2008, and 
the final episode was in August 30, 2008, the time frame for both corpora is from 
February 27, 2008 to December 30, 2008.7 Against the backdrop of these points, the news 
reports that focus on Noor are identified and selected for further analysis. The keywords 
used for the analysis are “Noor”, “Arabic dubbed Turkish television series”, “the 
representation of Turkish culture”, and “Turkey’s image”. The news reports which do 
not make any reference to the representation of Turkish culture in their coverage of 
Noor are excluded from the analysis.  
To conclude, the study comprises a small corpus of twenty Arabic news reports 
and eighteen Turkish news reports, a total of 29, 178 words. Even though the study 
involves a limited selection of Saudi and Turkish newspapers and the analysis is based 
only on one Arabic dubbed Turkish series aired in Saudi Arabia, the data can still be 
considered to provide a picture of the construction of Turkey’s self- and hetero-images. 
After brief information on Noor in the following sub-section, the study will illustrate the 
frames by means of various examples which I take to be representative.  
Brief information on Noor 
Noor tells the story of the relationship between Muhannad (Mehmet, in the Turkish 
series), a wealthy and handsome man who lives in Istanbul, and Noor (Gümüş, in the 
Turkish series), a young woman raised in a conservative Anatolian village. Noor and 
Muhannad’s marriage, which was arranged by Muhannad’s business-tycoon 
grandfather, is based on a modern and equal partnership in which Muhannad 
encourages his wife to achieve her career as a fashion designer. The story takes place in 
a historical mansion on Bosphorus shores. Although the protagonists violate Islamic 
taboos by drinking alcohol, dancing in nightclubs, having sex before marriage, having 
children outside of marriage and so forth, they observe certain religious traditions by 
praying, fasting, and respecting their family’s patriarchal model. Noor not only displays 
the romantic and mutually supportive relationship between men and women, but also 
foregrounds women’s liberation by portraying Noor as a woman who empowers 
herself to stand against her patriarchal family. As Salamandra (2012, p. 45) argues, 
                                                     
7 Four news reports published after 2008 are also involved in the study, because they give fruitful insight into Noor’s 
representation of Turkish culture. 
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Noor’s “ambiguity, like that of Turkey itself, invokes binaries of East and West, Islam 
and secularism, tradition and modernity enabling a range of commentary on the state of 
Arab society in general, and sexual relations in particular”. 
 
The framing of narratives in the Saudi newspapers 
The Saudi narratives on Arabic dubbed Turkish series reflect the “official Saudi unease 
about the popularity and rise of a rival and more appealing Sunni power in the Middle 
East” (Kraidy and Al-Ghazzy, 2013b, p. 2350). The news outlets in Saudi Arabia 
“quot[e] heavily from Turkish sources evincing that Ankara’s soft power went hand in 
hand with its geopolitical aspirations” (Leerssen, 2000, p. 284). Given that the debate 
revolves around “the role of television for new configurations of [Turkey’s] soft power” 
(Kaynak, 2015, p. 138), the Saudi media depict “all exports of Turkey as part of the 
larger strategy of the [Turkish] government’s policy goals in the region” (Kaynak, 2015, 
p. 245).  
For instance, Asharq al-Awsat foregrounds the ‘cultural invader’ frame to build 
Turkey’s hetero-image. In the face of the Turkish government’s statements which frame 
Turkey’s self-image as, in Salem’s (2015, p. 3) words, “a principled champion of 
peoples’ human and democratic rights in the [Middle East] region”, the report entitled 
“Under the head of Muhannad” criticizes the way the Turkish media constructs 
Turkey’s image as a transformer of Arabs’ habitus: 
The popularity which “Noor” and “Sanawat Al-Diaa” gained did not only 
surprise us, but also surprised the main actors of the series who found 
themselves during their visits to some Arab countries surrounded by so 
many crowds of admirers. This also puffed up the Turkish media and 
newspapers with arrogance, conceit and ignorance. They implied that 
Turkish series taught us, Arabs, how todress, love, and treat a woman 
(August 31, p. 2008).8 
The other news reports in Asharq al-Awsat, such as“The Turkish romantic invasion” 
(July 1, 2008),9 “Turkish series: culture shock?” (August 21, 2008),10 and “The dubbed 
                                                     
8 Accessed June 04, 2015. 
 http://archive.aawsat.com/leader.asp?section=3&report=485026&issueno=10869#.VuUpu_l97IU 
9 Accessed June 04, 2015.  
http://archive.aawsat.com/leader.asp?section=3&report=477065&issueno=10808#.VuaX1vl97IU 
10 Accessed June 04, 2015.   http://archive.aawsat.com/details.asp?issueno=10626&report=483643#.VuUpvfl97IU 
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series invades the TVs” (November 7, 2008),11 also use the frame of cultural invasion. It 
is significant to note that the news reports that use the cultural invasion frame 
frequently use nominalized forms of threat (threat/threats) and verbal forms 
(threatening, threaten and threatened) to portray Noor.  
In the face of the neo-Ottoman cool brand that is “largely dependent on popular 
culture and on being presented as a soft sell to Arab publics” (Kraidy and Al-Ghazzi, 
2013b, p. 2343), it is argued by another Saudi Arabian newspaper Al-Yaum that Noor 
represents Turkey’s image in a way which is disconnected from Muslims’ lives: 
Couple of years ago, the dubbed Mexican Drama invaded us, yet we 
used to find an answer to our kids’ curious questions on the actions of 
the protagonists of those dramas which contradicted with our values, 
tradition and religion which we were raised upon and we are raising our 
children on. We used to explain it to them that these protagonists come 
from a different culture and tradition and a different religion and that’s 
why we shouldn’t mimic them, as our religion advised us to not imitate 
those who are different from us. […] Turkish television series, such as 
Noor andSanwaat Al-Diaa, came to us in a Syrian accent that is very 
familiar to the Gulf society, and most of the people watch these series 
which are filled with scenes and values that contradict […] Islam’s 
values and principles […]. We tried really hard to explain the weird 
immoral stuff they watch which contradicts our moral sentiments; we 
tried so hard to convince them that we do not share the same tradition 
and culture with them [Turks] (April 12, 2009).12 
This excerpt argues that Arab and Turkish societies are different in terms of cultural 
and moral values. Given that, as Hall (1997, p. 238) argues, the discursive construction 
of otherness is necessary for identity formation, it is plausible to argue that the framing 
of Turkey as the Other makes Turkey’s othering constitutive to the Arabs’ cultural 
identity in the Saudi news narratives. Along similar lines, the other news reports in Al-
Yaum, such as “Turkish series reveal bad habits in the Gulf society” (August 26, 2008)13 
and “The Turkish series are silly and resemble Bollywood drama” (November 20, 
                                                     
11 Accessed June 04, 2015. 
http://archive.aawsat.com/leader.asp?section=3&report=477065&issueno=10808#.VuaX1vl97IU 
12 Accessed June 15, 2015. http://www.alyaum.com/report/2667658 
13 Accessed June 15, 2015. http://www.alyaum.com/report/2610996 
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2008),14 portray the Turkish series as debased, corrupt and harmful products of Turkish 
culture.  
When it comes to Al-Riyadh, it is possible to see that the narratives frame 
Turkey’s cultural otherness by highlighting the alienating effect of its television series.  
For instance, “Al-Riyadh asks the big question” places emphasis on the image of Turkey 
as a secular Western Other:  
The series revealed some of the faces of the daily life in the Turkish 
Muslim community, […]. And it might slip the viewer’s mind that 
Turkey is not only a Muslim country, it is also a secular country, it is 
militantly secular, it is a European country to a great extent, and it is 
close to joining the EU in all its values, customs and freedoms (August 
15, 2008).15 
This excerpt shows that Turkey’s otherness is portrayed within the context of 
‘secularism’ and ‘Europeanness’. Likewise, another Al-Riyadh report entitled “Beware of 
the tanned skin man” warns Arab viewers that the dubbing of Turkish series into 
Arabic makes Arabs regard those series as local programs and interiorize their culture-
specific values. The report argues that the Arabic dubbing of television series should be 
replaced with subtitling, since the latter would foreground the foreign nature of Turkish 
series, which would make Arab viewers realize Turkey’s cultural otherness: 
 
[…] If Turkish society is like this, let it be, it is its business. But if we 
have to watch their series, at least, let us watch it in their language 
subtitled, not dubbed into our language. Because anyone who dubbed 
any series to our language intends to deliver a complete message and 
bring it closer to us. […]. And this is exactly what the TV channels who 
are broadcasting these series are doing, they are presenting many 
issues and immoral values through these drama (April 25, 2009).16 
 
“The Turkish stars infect the [Arab] audience with beautiful madness” (July 10, 2008)17 
and “How did we send Muhannad’s generation to the road of loss?” (July 13, 2008)18 in 
                                                     
14 Accessed June 15, 2015. http://www.alyaum.com/report/2631406 
15 Accessed March 1, 2016. http://www.alriyadh.com/367472 
16 Accessed March 1, 2016. http://www.alriyadh.com/424899 
17 Accessed March 1, 2016. http://www.alriyadh.com/357854 
18 Accessed March 1, 2016. http://www.alriyadh.com/358855 
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Al-Riyadalso portray Turkey’s image in a negative way by using the frames of invasion 
and infection to describe how Turkey influences Arabs through its television series.  
As for Al-Jazirah, the most prominent frames are cultural destruction and threat. 
“The desired: the wedding gown of the President’s daughter” underlines that such 
series as Noor 
became a hot topic in the Arab World. They are the representatives of 
the Turkish culture […]. They threatened the foundations of our stable 
homes, especially the fragile ones, and are almost close to destroying 
our Fitra, as their protagonists are now viewed as idols, their fashion 
style has become our youth’s. Moreover their immoral depraved 
actions are looked at as a role model. These series have become a major 
threat on the society and are almost going to destroy what is left from 
our Islamic morals and values (December 18, 2008).19 
It is significant to note here that the us and them frame signifies that it is the Turks who 
“destroy […] [Arabs’] Islamic morals and values”. Likewise, another news report “Some 
fishing from the shores of Al-Jazirah” labels the series as the primary vehicle of 
transferring “dangerous foreign values” to the Arab audience. The news report under 
discussion emphasizes that Arabic dubbed Turkish series 
Pass dangerous foreign values that somehow try to turn the inside out 
of our social values system. They encourage fornication by 
representing it as a normal human behavior through situations and 
social life stories; we naturally face in our life, where it is actually 
abnormal and unacceptable. These series are based on the foreign 
secular ideas which Muslim Turkish society still suffers from (August 
20, 2008).20 
Obviously, even though the excerpt depicts Turkey as a Muslim society, secularism is 
used as a frame to denote Turkey’s cultural foreignness. Another Al-Jazirahnews report 
entitled “The mined Turkish series” corroborates the other reports by positioning 
dubbed series in the larger narrative of the Turkish cultural invasion through sensitive 
key words (e.g. “mined”, “desperate”, and the like: 
We are today in desperate need to fight this foreign destructive 
cultural invasion, […]. We also need to dedicate our efforts towards 
                                                     
19 Accessed March 3, 2016. http://www.al-jazirah.com/2008/20081218/ar9.htm 
20 Accessed March 3, 2016. http://www.al-jazirah.com/2008/20080820/ar8.htm 
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raising people’s awareness in understanding the danger of such series 
(April 10, 2014).21 
As for Al-Madina, “The dubbed politics in the Turkish series” claims that Arabic dubbed 
Turkish series give rise to a neo-Ottomanist political agenda that is presented by Turkey 
as an appealing alternative for modernity in the Middle East. Noting that Turkish series 
can revive the Ottoman past in the Middle East, the news report portrays Turkey’s 
image by using the invasion frame: 
 […] After we all become Ottomans, every Ottoman on this earth will 
be able to watch his life-story in a dubbed series; it is part of the politics 
of dubbing. […] These series are part of the Turkish invasion in the 
Arab world […] (May 25, 2012).22 
In a similar vein, another Al-Madinanews report entitled “Turkish drama: invasion and 
accumulated impact” places emphasis on the destructive impact of the series which is 
argued to represent a decadent lifestyle:  
The dubbed Turkish series invaded the simple mind and heart of the 
Arab viewer, especially the young ones and teenagers of both genders 
alike, and the series’ characters and protagonists who are indulged in 
forbidden relationships were met with a complete approval from the 
viewer, which caused the producers  and the funders to work hard to 
flood the media market with these series, up to the point where the 
most prominent exports of these series spread the culture of betrayals 
and moral degeneration. […] And what added salt to injury is that the 
owners of these TV channels are insisting on implanting this culture 
and watering it with second and third seasons and even a tenth in order 
to continue with this immersion in forbidden sins (May 11, 2012).23 
Taking a similar stand, the Saudi newspaper Okaz promotes the narrative of 
neocolonialism to highlight that Arab Muslims are vulnerable to attacks which take 
place mostly in the form of global capitalism. The report caters for the narrative position 
of cultural conservatives who accuse Western powers of launching cultural invasion in 
the Arab world (see al-Qaradawi, 2000, p. 196-198). The following excerpt from the 
                                                     
21 Accessed March 3, 2016. http://www.al-jazirah.com/2014/20140610/ar7.htm 
22 Accessed March 5, 2016. http://www.al-madina.com/node/380035 
23 Accessed March 5, 2016. http://www.al-madina.com/node/302335 
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news report entitled “The Turkish series and the viewers” illustrates this point as 
follows: 
 
[…] Thinking clearly of the effect of the Turkish series on the society 
leads to a dangerous conclusion that some of us are amenable and frail 
and can easily be affected by neo-colonialism […] Beside that its 
heroines are usually dressed up in short revealing clothes, which comes 
as implicit invitations for our girls to mimic them, particularly the heros 
are admired by in this series (July 22, 2008).24 
 
Depicting Arabs as “amenable and frail” people, the report re-sites the narrative on 
Noor in the context of several broader narratives relating to the neo-Ottoman invasion of 
the Arab world. Another Okaz report entitled “The dubbed series are a big danger on 
our society’s morals and values” also highlights this point as follows: 
[…] they pose a significant threat to our conservative society’s morals 
and values, calling for a moral revolution against all these destructive 
projects (September 30, 2010).25 
“The Turkish series invades the Arab TV Channels after the Mexicans”26 (April 16, 2008) 
and “The dubbed drama invades the TV Channels and competes with Arabic Drama”27 
(September 15, 2010) in Okaz also foreground the invader frame to build Turkey’s 
image. 
The framing of narratives in the Turkish newspapers 
Owing to the popularity of television series in the Middle East and their capacity to 
create soft power, those countries which manage to export its own  series “can, at least 
to a certain extent, spread its worldview, values, and ideas to Arab populations, and 
build cultural prestige in the region” (Jabbour, p. 2015). Therefore, Turkey’s narrative of 
Arabic dubbed Turkish series is based on the official statements that those series which 
embrace Muslim lifestyle and Western democracy create an image of stability and 
peace, introduce contemporary Turkey to the world and become one of the cornerstones 
of Turkey’s soft power (Rousselin, 2013, p. 20-21). 
                                                     
24 Accessed March 8, 2016. http://www.okaz.com.sa/okaz/osf/20080722/Con20080722211489.htm 
25 Accessed , March 8, 2016.   http://www.okaz.com.sa/new/issues/20100930/Con20100930374880.htm 
26 Accessed March 8, 2016. http://www.okaz.com.sa/okaz/osf/20080416/Con20080416188412.htm 
27 Accessed March 8, 2016. http://www.okaz.com.sa/new/issues/20100915/Con20100915372289.htm 
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In Hurriyet, the news report entitled “Noor’s romanticism for Arab women” 
argues that Noor’s representation of Turkish culture is a key factor that alters Arabs’ 
perception of Turkey: 
Arabs once saw Turkey as a secular and pro-Western country and 
thought that Turkey shares very few common points with its Muslim 
neighbours. However, Noor has changed this. The number of Arab 
tourists who visit Turkey is gradually increasing. What is more, Noor 
has opened new horizons for those Arab women who long for romantic 
love and freer life in their extremely conservative society (August 31, 
2008).28 
As the excerpt reveals, Turkey’s image is portrayed not only as a secular and Western, 
but also a Muslim state. In this context, Çevik (2014, p. 97) underlines that Noor’s 
storyline places emphasis on women who “represent a synthesis of modernity and 
traditionalism, a very impeccable reflection of the in-between sentiment of Turkish 
society”. This enables Arab viewers to identify themselves with the Turkish characters 
that oscillate between the norms of a traditionalist society and the demands of the 
modern age. In another Hurriyet report entitled “Tukey’s soft power: television series”, 
Turkey’s image is framed as a synthesis that blends modern Western lifestyle with 
traditional Islamic values: 
Noor has become such a phenomenon that 85 million people watched its 
last episode in 22 countries. Turkey owes, to some extent, its recent 
tourism success to television series […]. The point which makes Turkish 
series popular abroad is that they reflect Turkey’s modern face and 
traditional character at the same time (February 7, 2011).29 
The popular reach of Noor is also linked, in this report, to “[its] modelling [of] an 
alternative way of modernization”, to use Kaynak’s (2015, p. 243) words, which is a 
“third way” that efficiently embeds a modern lifestyle in Islam (Rohde 2013, p. 146). In 
its coverage of Arabic dubbed Turkish series, Sabah gives place to criticisms directed by 
the Arab mass media against Noor. Similar to the news narratives circulated by Hürriyet, 
Sabah frames Turkey’s image in the context of Arab women’s liberation. Furthermore, 
Sabah uses the role model frame to construct Turkey’s self-image. For instance, the news 
report entitled “Noor shakes Arab traditions” underlines that 
                                                     
28 Accessed July 13, 2015. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/arap-kadinlarinin-gumus-romantizmi-9785710 
29 Accessed June 05, 2015. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/turkiye-nin-yumusak-gucu-dizileri-19414165 
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[...] the foreign press agencies publicisize the claim of some clerics in the 
West Bank and Saudi Arabia that Noor is not in harmony with Islam 
and hence should not be watched; it is also underlined that the series 
might be spreading the seeds of change [in the Middle East]. Turkey 
provides Arab viewers with more opportunities to identify themselves 
with [the series’ characters] than the Western productions do. […] 
Female viewers see independent Turkish women as a role model (July 
28, 2008).30 
The role model frame is also used by Cumhuriyet. “Turkish series launched a revolution 
in the region’s culture” exemplifies this point particularly effectively: 
The series launched a revolution in the culture of the [Middle East] 
region. We can see some countries which do not broadcast and even 
do not imagine to boradcast such series in which women dress up 
differently and behave differently. Noor was the most popular series 
in 2008 (September 18, 2010).31 
Along similar lines “Arabs loved Turkish series” (February 23, 2009)32 and “Tourists 
who are flocking to see locations of television series are a source of income [for 
Turkey]” (August 8, 2010)33 frame Arabized Turkish series in the context of Turkey’s 
soft power in the Arab world. The positive image-setting approach of the Turkish 
newspapers above is also maintained by Radikal. The following excerpt from “Turkish 
series played a role in the Arab spring” claims that Turkey played a major role in Arab 
women’s liberation owing to its television series that facilitated women’s role in the 
Arab Spring:  
[…] According to a research in Saudi Arabia, Noor has resulted in the 
realization of freedom for 63% of Arab women […]. The Arab Spring 
                                                     
30 Accessed June 07, 2015. 
http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2008/07/28/haber,84245B4862824DEC88A805F4990E8906.html  
31 Accessed June 10, 2015. 
http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/diger/179418/Turk_dizileri_bolge_kulturunde_devrim_yaratiyor.html# 
32 Accessed June 10, 2015. http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/diger/43958/Araplar_Turk_dizilerini_sevdi.html 
33 Accessed June 10, 2015. 
http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/diger/169338/Dizi_setleri_Arap_turistlerden_de_kazaniyor.html 
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owes its existence to women, and it is Turkey that mobilized Arab 
women through its series (December 28, 2012).34 
As the excerpt shows, Turkey is portrayed as an agent that initiates social 
transformation in the Middle East. Radikal also gives place to “A research refutes the 
claim that Turkish series launched cultural invasion” (September 19, 2013),35 which 
refers to EylemYanardağoğlu and Imad Karam’s (2013) paper “The fever that hit Arab 
satellite television: audience perceptions of Turkish television series”. In order to 
disprove the Arab narrative that Turkish series are an instrument of cultural invasion, 
the report highlights Yanardağoğlu and Karam’s (2013, p. 561) point that Arab 
audiences do not see Turkish series as “culprits that corrupt cultural identity”. The last 
relevant report in Radikal “Turkey: the rising star in the Arab world” (March 12, 2009) 
frames Turkey’s self-image as a holder of soft-power in the Middle East.36 
As for Yeni Şafak, the soft power frame is used to build Turkey’s image in the 
Middle East. For instance, “Noor challenges Arab traditions” (June 28, 2008) elaborates 
the narrative that the series’ representation of Turkish society can be a source of 
inspiration for other Middle Eastern societies.37  Furthermore, the news report “Arabs 
desire a country such as Turkey rather than Iran” argues that Turkish series play a 
significant role in portraying Turkey’s positive image: 
 
[…] the most popular television programs in the Middle East are 
Turkish series. These series present a life style to Arab viewers. And 
they change Arabs’ image of Turkey to a great extent. […] [Arab] 
viewers love our actors and actresses very much (February 7, 2011).38 
At this point, it is necessary to consider the response of the conservative Islamist 
segments of Turkish society towards Turkish television series. Conservative Islamists in 
Turkey severely criticize domestic television series, arguing that they violate several 
religious tabooes, such as extra-marital sexuality, consumption of alcohol, and manners 
of dress that contradict with Islam (Kaynak, 2015, p. 233-234). Therefore, it is necessary 
to note that Yeni Şafak’s coverage of Arabic dubbed Turkish series largely competes with 
                                                     
34 Accessed June 17, 2015. http://www.radikal.com.tr/hayat/turk-dizileri-arap-baharinda-rol-oynadi-1114235/ 
35 Accessed June 17, 2015. http://www.radikal.com.tr/hayat/turk-dizilerinin-kulturel-istila-yaptigi-iddiasini-curuten-
arastirma-1151621/ 
36 Accessed June 17, 2015. http://www.radikal.com.tr/radikal.aspx?atype=haberyazdir&reportid=925793 
37 Accessed June 25, 2015. http://www.yenisafak.com/aktuel/gumus-dizisi-arap-geleneklerini-sarsiyor-131482 
38 Accessed June 17, 2015. http://www.yenisafak.com/roportaj/araplarin-istegi-iran-degil-turkiye-olmak-301847 
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the narratives of other conservative Islamist segments of Turkish society. One would 
argue that Yeni Şafak, which typifies the conservative Islamist press media in Turkey, 
promotes Turkey’s positive image within the context of Arabic dubbed Turkish series, 
since those series are seen as Turkish cultural exports in the international arena. 
 
Conclusion 
This study has set out to explore how the most widely circulated Saudi Arabian and 
Turkish newspapers frame narratives on Turkey’s image in their coverage of Noor. The 
following conclusions are drawn in light of the study’s corpora that illustrate how news 
framing contributes to the representation of Turkey’s self- and hetero-images: 
 
 While Turkey’s self-image as a role model in the Middle East is identified as an 
exaggeration in the Saudi news corpus, the role model frame is systematically 
used by the selected Turkish newspapers to represent Turkey. 
 While Turkey’s image is framed within the context of cultural threat in the Saudi 
news narratives, the Turkish narratives portray Turkey as the holder of soft 
power in the Middle East. 
 The cultural invasion frame is explicitly used in the selected Saudi newspapers, 
whereas the social transformation and revolution frames are used in the Turkish 
newspapers that depict Turkey’s influence on the Middle East. 
 The Saudi news corpus is dominated by the narrative that Turkish and Saudi 
societies are different in terms of culture and tradition. The selected Saudi 
newspapers elaborate the narrative that Turkey contradicts Muslim-Arab values; 
and they foreground the us and them frame. In this context, the construction of 
Turkey’s image as the cultural Other seems to make Turkey’s othering 
constitutive to the Muslim-Arab cultural identity in the Saudi news. The Turkish 
news reports, however, represent Turkey as a synthesis of modern Western 
lifestyle and traditional Islamic values.  
 Whereas the Turkish newspapers frame Turkey’s secularism in a positive context 
by labelling it as an inspiration for the Middle East, the Saudi newspapers 
foreground Turkey’s secular character in order to represent Turkey as a secular 
Western Other.  
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Against this background, it is plausible to argue that Turkey’s self-image is framed in a 
way that fits in the larger narratives of Turkey’s perception of its role (e.g. regional 
leader and soft power) in the Middle East. On the other hand, the frames (e.g. cultural 
invader and neo-colonial threat) that construct Turkey’s hetero-image in Saudi 
narratives dovetail with the larger narratives on Turkey circulating in the Arab world. It 
goes without saying that the frames highlighted above give rise to the emergence of the 
broader frames of ‘neo-Ottoman cool’ and ‘neo-Ottoman colonialism’ in the Turkish 
and Saudi media, respectively. This point reveals the Turkish newspapers’ promotion of 
a positive self-image against a largely negative representation of the Turkish cultural 
Other in the Saudi newspapers that cover Noor. 
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